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Much of the debate around rankings has focused on methodological problems—which 
indicators and weightings, the credibility of the statistical process, and why (or why 
not) inconsistencies arise. There are also complaints about the overreliance on research 
rather than teaching. Yet, there has been little commentary about the increasing use of 
quantitative methodologies to drive decision making at the national or institutional 
level—what I call policymaking by numbers. The same issues arise about performance 
indicators, in general. 
Have rankings accelerated this trend? And, because indicators incentivize 
behavior, are we measuring what counts or are we doing what gets measured—a classic 
case of “goal displacement”? 
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SELECTIVITY  
Student-entry levels are generally considered a good indicator for student achievement, 
on the assumption that a student’s performance is roughly similar throughout their 
higher education career. For example, US Scholastic Achievement Test scores correlate 
strongly with graduation and retention rates, future incomes, and graduate school 
admissions. Other higher education systems and institutions use college-entry scores, 
preparatory examinations, or secondary school scores for the same reason. 
This practice is reinforced by university rankings, such as US News & World Report 
and the Times Higher Education World University Rankings, which use student entry 
scores as a proxy for educational quality—worth 15 percent and 9.5 percent, 
respectively. The greater the number of smart students are admitted, the higher a 
university can score. High-ability and second-generation students—the latter from 
Asian backgrounds (or non-US citizens)—wanting a doctoral, medical, or law degree 
are especially sensitive to rankings. A virtuous circle is created due to the link between 
rankings, reputation, and selectivity. 
Selectivity is becoming a perverse driver of higher education and student 
behavior. Universities seek to improve their rank by a range of enrollment management 
practices—including influencing the number of applications received, while retaining 
the same number of available places. In this way, the selectivity index rises. Higher 
education institutions may limit class or cohort size. They may also use higher tuition 
fees to signal selectivity; that the majority of UK universities have chosen the maximum 
£9,000 (US$14,700) tuition fee is symptomatic of this mind-set. Others use financial aid 
to attract high-calibre students rather than students with the greatest need. Like many 
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US universities, the UK government has encouraged universities to offer “special deals” 
to high achievers. 
 
COMPLETION RATES 
Today, policy is concerned not just with the number of students who enter an 
institution but the number who actually complete and graduate within a determined 
time frame. In this way, responsibility shifts to the institution to ensure that students 
progress successfully through the system. US News & World Report and the European 
Union’s new U-Multirank measure an institution’s predictive graduation rate; the latter 
also measures graduate (un)employability. This aspect is often captured by surveys of 
employer groups, such as those conducted by QS World University Rankings. 
However, performance is influenced by many factors, including student 
socioeconomic profile. Measuring graduation rates may be disadvantageous to lower 
socioeconomic and ethnically disadvantaged groups or mature students, whose life or 
family circumstances disturb normal study; while measuring graduation rates can 
encourage institutions to abandon educational standards. 
This may undermine institutions that are working hard to provide widening 
participation opportunities to new student groups or to students who might use this 
opportunity to transfer to higher-ranked or other universities. There is already evidence 
that institutions are abandoning programs aimed at widening access or establishing 
arms-length colleges, so that the poorer-performance scores do not affect the 
university’s overall ranking. Others, as mentioned above, are changing the conditions of 
their scholarships. 
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A major handicap for first destination employment data is the time frame; surveys 
usually concentrate on the first six to nine months postgraduation, which is inadequate 
for many types of careers and is unable to distinguish between employment on 
graduate-level jobs or underemployed. While the time frame may provide useful 
information during a period of active economic growth, is the information an accurate 
reflection of educational quality during a recession such as the current one? 
 
MEASURING RESEARCH 
Measuring research productivity and impact through bibliometric and citation data is a 
widespread methodology for assessing academic and research quality and is a key 
indicator for various rankings. A related practice is ranking journals, whereby the 
quality of a journal is determined by its local, national, or worldwide scientific reach. 
The Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities awards 20 percent of its score to 
just two publications, Science and Nature; and SCImago uses the journals’ scientific 
prestige, the SJR indicator, to rank journals based on citations. 
Quantity is correlated with quality—despite normalization for discipline, 
institution size, and age. This tends to reward larger and older universities and the 
physical, life, and medical sciences—due to their publishing habits. This means other 
important sources or publication formats—such as, books and conference proceedings, 
contribution to international standards or policy reports, electronic formats or open 
source publications, etc.—are all ignored. Nationally relevant, interdisciplinary, but 
non-English-language research is under-reported and undervalued. 
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Many governments, research agencies, and institutions link this exercise to 
resource allocation. Not surprisingly, these trends are already producing distortions in 
research focus and research management: encouraging academics to write journal 
articles rather than reflective books or policy papers, discouraging intellectual risk 
taking—favoring the “hard sciences” over the arts, humanities or social sciences, and 
informing hiring and firing. 
 
LESSONS 
These brief examples raise questions about the way in which indicators can shape 
policy decisions and incentivize behavior. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that 
governments and higher education institutions around the world are using rankings 
deliberately in this way, rolling them into key performance indicators, to inform targets 
and award results. In other instances, governments are making profound structural 
changes to their national systems in order to push a few elite universities into the top 
20, 50, or 100 of global rankings. 
 The history of rankings shows measuring the wrong things can produce 
distortions. The US National Governors Association Center for Best Practice similarly 
cautioned in 2009 against relying on methodologies that can inadvertently create 
perverse incentives. This should be a critical lesson for all governments and institutions. 
